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Producing Random Bits with Delay-Line-Based
Ring Oscillators
Mieczysław Jessa and Łukasz Matuszewski
Abstract—One of the sources of randomness for a random bit
generator (RBG) is jitter present in rectangular signals produced
by ring oscillators (ROs). This paper presents a novel approach
for the design of delays used in these oscillators. We suggest
using delay elements made on carry4 primitives instead of series
of inverters or latches considered in the literature. It enables
the construction of many high frequency ring oscillators with
different nominal frequencies in the same field programmable
gate array (FPGA). To assess the unpredictability of bits pro-
duced by RO-based RBG, the restarts mechanism, proposed in
earlier papers, was used. The output sequences pass all NIST
800-22 statistical tests for smaller number of ring oscillators than
the constructions described in the literature. Due to the number
of ROs with different nominal frequencies and the method of
construction of carry4 primitives, it is expected that the proposed
RBG is more robust to cryptographic attacks than RBGs using
inverters or latches as delay element.
Keywords—ring oscillator, jitter, random bit generator, com-
bined generator.
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE of promising techniques for producing random bitsequences that pass all statistical tests is combining
XOR bit streams produced by independent generators with
weak statistical properties. The generators, called the source
generators, can use different sources of randomness. It can
be noise generated by a physical system [1]–[5], metastable
states [6]–[10], the chaos phenomenon [11]–[19] or jitter
produced by ring oscillators [20]–[29]. Mixed solutions that
combine various properties of these basic techniques also
exist. From a cryptography perspective, analog solutions have
several drawbacks. They are: the access to random bits which
have to be sent to a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
implementing a cryptographic system, continuous work which
can reveal weaknesses of the entropy source, the sensitivity to
power attack which degenerate the quality of random source or
a small output bit rates (below 1 Mbit/s). Such sources require
also developed methods for continuous monitoring to detect
imperfections of entropy source caused by internal or external
conditions. An alternative seems to be random bit generators
(RBGs) which use jitter observed in ring oscillators. Such
generators can be easily integrated with cryptographic systems
in the same FPGA. The RBGs can produce random bits “on
demand” which are not visible outside FPGA. Such generator
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was proposed by Sunar at. al. in 2007 [30] and next modified
by Wold and Tan in 2008 [31]. The output bit rate reported
by Wold and Petrovic´ achieved 300 Mbit/s, and the output
streams passed statistical tests for 25 source generators [32].
A year later, N. Bochard et al. showed experimentally that
such a generator can produce bit streams that pass statistical
tests when no random component is present in the ring gen-
erators [33], which indicates that this generator should not be
a source of randomness. To distinguish between randomness
and pseudo-randomness, M. Jessa and M. Jaworski proposed
in 2010 to use the chi-square test and the restart mechanism
[34]. Through experiments with real circuits, it was proved
that a very small amount of randomness, present in a single-
ring oscillator, accumulates as the function of the number
of bits combined XOR at the same time instant [34], [35].
The generator of Wold and Tan can provide a bit sequence
suitable for cryptographic applications, when we choose every
j-th bit from the original sequence, where j is greater than
a certain minimum value mmin [34], [35]. It significantly
reduces the throughput, e.g., from 300 Mbit/s, declared in
[32], to approximately 7.14 Mbit/s for 50 source generators
[34]. This value depends on the location of the project in
the field-programmable gate array and may vary for different
types of FPGAs. It was also observed that the frequencies
of neighbor ROs may depend on each other when they are
implemented in the same FPGA [36]. Therefore, the designers
try to place the source generators in the FPGA “suitably” to
avoid interactions. This approach usually gives satisfactory
results but is impractical for industry. Ring-oscillator-based
RBG can also be attacked with the use of frequency injection
attack [37]. During this attack, a certain number of ROs lock
to frequencies injected into the power supply, eliminating the
independence of the generators and significantly reducing the
randomness of the output bit stream. A method for eliminating
this weakness of the RO-based combined RBG was proposed
in 2012 in conference paper [38]. In this paper, we describe
wider this method and propose its modification. The goal of
the modification is to increase the randomness of a single
random source and, consequently, the reduction the value of
mmin. As previously, the key point of the method is to ensure
different nominal frequencies of ROs which prevents coupling
between neighbor ROs and locking the frequencies of many
ROs to the “injected” frequency. The output bit streams pass
the NIST 800-22 tests without any additional post-processing,
necessary for analog RBGs.
In Section II, the structure of the combined RBG and a brief
theory of RO-based RBG are introduced. The construction
of the delay element, used in all ROs, is described in the
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same section. Section III presents a method and the results
of assessing the amount of true randomness present in output
signals of the combined RBG using a series of primitives,
called carry4. A method for enhancing the randomness of the
combined RBG using carry4 is described in Section IV. The
results of statistical tests are presented in Section V. The paper
ends with the conclusions.
II. COMBINING XOR INDEPENDENT RANDOM BITS
PRODUCED BY MANY RO-BASED RBGS
A. Jitter Produced by Ring Oscillators as a Source of Ran-
domness
A simple method of producing random bits is sampling the
rectangular wave produced by a ring oscillator (Fig. 1). The
frequency fH of the RO is usually several times greater than
the frequency fL of the quartz oscillator. To achieve almost
perfectly random bits in the circuit from Fig. 1 it is necessary
to sample the ring oscillator at a very low frequency [29]. A D-
type flip-flop is triggered by a quartz oscillator that establishes
the output bit rate. Ring oscillator shown in Fig. 1 consists of
inverter and delay τ connected into a ring. A delay element τ
can be realized with an even number of inverters, a chain of
latches or a delay line built in many FPGAs.
Ring oscillator from Fig. 1 can be simply implemented
in reconfigurable logic as FPGA and CPLD. Thanks for its
simplicity, ROs have become the main block in many digital
systems, e.g., in voltage-controlled oscillators, serial data
transmitters, temperature and voltage sensors on a chip etc.
This simple structure and the underlying physical phenomena
observed in the RBG from Fig. 1 have been widely studied
[20]–[29], [39], [40]. Due to relatively large amount of jitter,
present in generated signal, ROs are increasingly used as
a source of randomness in hardware true random number
generators [20]–[29], [39]. Frequency of signal generated by
a single ring oscillator is equal to
fH =
1
2
∑
k
1
dk
, (1)
where dk is a delay of the k-th component of RO. The
expression is true if all components are ideal and delays
related with interconnections are ignored. In real circuit this
factor is very important and cannot be ignored [36]. Moreover,
propagation delays in all circuit paths and gates vary in
time, because of shot noise, thermal noise and supply voltage
Fig. 1. Jitter oscillator sampling as a method of producing random bits.
instability [27], [39]. Having regards to this phenomenon the
equation (1) must be submitted as
fH =
1
2
∑
k
1
dk + dik +∆dtk +∆dvk,+∆drk
(2)
where dk denotes constant delay of the k-th delay element,
dik is the delay of the k-th interconnections in ring oscillator,
∆dtk is the variation of the delay in the k-th component
and interconnection caused by variation of temperature, ∆dvk
represents the variation of the delay in the k-th component and
interconnection caused by supply voltage instability and ∆drk
define others random delays in the k-th element and path in
the ring oscillator, e.g., transition spacing or crosstalk’s.
The frequency of the ring oscillator can vary in time
thanks to changes of ∆dt, ∆dv and ∆dr. This variations are
called jitter. Because as central limit theorem states that many
independent random variables have normal distribution, jitter
in RO’s follows with Gaussian distribution. Components which
vary in time can be written as [27]
∆dt = ∆dtn + p ·∆dtd,
∆dv = ∆dvn + p ·∆dvd,
∆dr = ∆drn + p ·∆drd
(3)
where ∆dtn, ∆dvn, ∆drn are nondeterministic components
and ∆dtd, ∆dvd, ∆drd are deterministic components, the
value of p is a proportion factor. The nondeterministic el-
ements stands on nondeterministic jitter, which is an ideal
source of entropy, through which is possible to produces
random bits in sampling process. Both nondeterministic and
deterministic jitter increases as a function of delay length
and with measurement interval. This jitter accumulation is
a consequence of the earlier disturbances [40]. Using equation
(2), the instantaneous frequency of ring oscillator with jitter
accumulation is
fH =
1
2
∑
k
1
dk + dik +∆Ja
(4)
where
∆Ja =
∑
k
∆dtk,+∆dvk +∆drk (5)
is an accumulated jitter during previous half period of signal
with frequency of fH and k delay elements [27]. It can be
divided into deterministic factor and nondeterministic
∆Ja = ∆Jan +∆Jad, (6)
where
∆Jan =
∑
k
∆tnk +∆dvnk +∆drnk (7)
denotes an accumulated nondeterministic jitter and
∆Jad = p ·
∑
k
∆tdk +∆vdk +∆drdk (8)
represents an accumulated deterministic jitter with proportion
factor of p. As was mentioned in [40] standard deviation of
nondeterministic jitter accumulated in ROs is proportional to
square root of time. Deterministic jitter has standard deviation
proportional to time. It follows that the deterministic jitter
accumulates faster than nondeterministic one.
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Fig. 2. Combined RO-based RBG.
B. Combined RO-Based RBG
The scheme of combining XOR of K with K > 1 bit
streams produced by RO-based RBGs is shown in Fig. 2 [35].
The K element set of source generators is divided into groups.
The number of elements in each group does not exceed the
number n of inputs of a single lookup table (LUT). First, we
combine XOR bits produced by source generators belonging
to the same group. The output bits are next sampled by the
same clock to form a new set of source streams. The new
source streams are divided into new groups. The streams inside
the same group are combined XOR, and the bits obtained are
sampled by the same clock, producing the next source stream,
etc. The process ends when one bit is produced. Figure 2
illustrates this process for no more than 63 = 216 source
generators (n = 6).
The combined RBG produces the first bit with a delay equal
to three periods of the quartz oscillator. To assess the quality
of the generated sequence, the bits are sent to a personal
computer (PC) via a buffer and a USB 2.0 interface. No
post-processing is performed in the PC. We assume that the
source generators have frequencies fH,l, l = 1, 2, . . . ,K ,
which are not lower than fL, where fL is the frequency of
the quartz oscillator. The placement of all elements depends
on the software provided by the manufacturer of the FPGA.
We do not perform any manual corrections for the localizations
proposed by this software.
The combined RBG proposed by Wold and Tan, studied by
many authors, uses ROs with the same number of inverters as
the delay τ . Its modification, discussed in [35] and [38] ex-
TABLE I
THE FREQUENCY OF ROS IMPLEMENTED IN VIRTEX-5
Inverters as τ Latches as τ
K No. of Frequency No. of Frequency
inverters [MHz] latches [MHz]
1 2 735 1 667
2 4 645 2 503
3 6 303 3 299
4 8 260 4 210
5 10 164 5 207
6 12 168 6 157
7 14 164 7 130
8 16 132 8 113
9 18 129 9 115
10 20 123 10 96
11 22 113 11 82
12 24 111 12 76
13 26 106 13 72
14 28 107 14 67
15 30 81 15 63
16 32 68 16 62
17 34 51 17 57
18 36 59 18 50
19 38 55 19 49
20 40 49 20 43
21 42 32 21 37
22 44 41 22 32
23 46 23 23 26
24 48 26 24 42
25 50 23 25 12
ploits as τ latches but it still assumes that the number of latches
is the same for the all source generators. The differences in
nominal frequencies of ROs result only from technological
differences and the length of the connections between elements
of each RO. Consequently, the frequencies of the rectangular
waves generated by ROs may be very similar. They can also be
clustered in groups, especially for a small number of inverters
[31], [36]. Due to the non-ideal separation between ROs, the
oscillators can synchronize each other using the phenomenon
of injection synchronization discovered for the van der Pol
oscillator [41]. Similar frequencies are also responsible for the
success of injection attack, as described in [37]. To overcome
this disadvantage, the ROs should have significantly different
frequencies, and the manipulation of τ should be hard. It
requires to use ring oscillators with at least different τ in
a combined RBG. For example, the first RO can use two
inverters or one latch, the second RO can have four inventers
or two latches as τ , and so on. Table I contains the frequencies
of K = 25 ROs implemented in Virtex-5 (XC5VLX50T)
manufactured by Xilinx [42]. The values from this table are
illustrated in Fig. 3. We have chosen K = 25 because this
number of ROs was reported in the literature as sufficient to
pass the statistical tests for fL = 100 MHz. All the frequencies
were measured with a frequency counter.
A greater τ does not always imply a smaller frequency
of the RO due to delays introduced by internal connections
between slices available in Virtex-5. The length of these
connections depends on the placement of elements. In our
case, it was determined by the software (ISE Design Suite)
provided by Xilinx – the manufacturer of the FPGA. We
did not perform any manual corrections for the localizations
proposed by this software.
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Fig. 3. The frequencies of ROs as a function of K for τ implemented as
different numbers of inverters and latches [38].
Table I indicates that the use of inverters or latches as τ
is inefficient because the condition fH > fL satisfies only 14
ROs with inverters and 9 with latches when fL = 100 MHz.
For fL = 200 MHz, we have 4 ROs with inverters and 5
ROs with latches. The above values for K are insufficient to
pass the statistical tests by the combined RBG using ROs with
significantly different frequencies. We need a different source
of delay with a higher granulation.
C. The Use of Carry4 as Delay τ
A series of primitives, called carry4, is available in Xilinx
FPGAs [42]. It can be used as a tapped delay line with a slight
delay between adjacent taps. The carry4 located in Virtex-5
slices is shown in Fig. 4. It is located in each slice of Virtex-5
FPGA. Carry4 consists of a series of four MUXes and XORs
that connect to the other logic [42]. Fast carry chain logic
was designed to make arithmetical functions such as adders,
subtractors, and comparators faster and easier to implement.
As shown in [43], carry4 is also applicable fast carry logic as
delay τ in ring oscillators, configured as follows: the output
of the inverter from Fig. 2 comes to carry4 input CI, and the
delayed signal comes to one of the outputs CO(3. . . 0) (Fig. 4)
and to the inverter input from Fig. 1. One carry4 primitive
gives four delay taps. If more delay units were required,
primitives were connected in series. For ring oscillator number
l, l = 1, 2, . . . ,K delay was l delay units. For example,
for RO number six, the sixth tap was used. Each RO had
Fig. 4. Xilinx Virtex-5 fast carry chain logic primitive (Carry4) [42].
a delay line with a different delay length, and thus each RO
had significantly different nominal frequency. The reason for
using carry chain logic as the τ delay element is the ease of
implementation and small delay per one tap, which allows the
design of many high frequency ring oscillators.
The main disadvantage of this type of solution is the high
area occupancy in FPGA. Nevertheless, the carry4 primitive is
an excellent part of FPGA to use as a delay line in RO-based
RBGs.
The frequencies of ROs for increasing values of τ are shown
in Table II and illustrated in Fig. 5. Similar to inverters and
latches, greater τ does not always imply a smaller frequency
of the RO. Due to the greater granulation, condition fH > fL
satisfies 61 ROs for fL = 200 MHz and 37 ROs for fL = 300
MHz.
Consequently, the throughput can be greater than that for
RBGs using ROs with different numbers of inverters or latches.
The precise value depends on the results of statistical tests
and the randomness of the RBG measured by the restarts
mechanism.
The price of greater frequency granulation are greater
resources used by the FPGA [38]. From a cryptography
perspective, the amount of resources devoted to random bit
generation is not critical for most of the cryptographic systems
because the basic goal is security of the system.
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TABLE II
THE FREQUENCIES OF ROS WITH DELAY LINES CARRY4 (VIRTEX-5)
K Frequency [MHz] K Frequency [MHz]
1 639 33 339
2 739 34 400
3 599 35 282
4 499 36 402
5 461 37 262
6 462 38 348
7 382 39 331
8 433 40 264
9 418 41 251
10 454 42 375
11 417 43 360
12 355 44 242
13 373 45 221
14 375 46 239
15 400 47 235
16 391 48 229
17 366 49 231
18 341 50 310
19 368 51 234
20 359 52 226
21 383 53 242
22 353 54 224
23 358 55 222
24 370 56 171
25 330 57 219
26 293 58 223
27 325 59 179
28 327 60 214
29 294 61 207
30 328 62 210
31 324 63 274
32 292 64 187
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Fig. 5. The frequencies of ROs as a function of K (increasing τ ).
III. ASSESSING THE AMOUNT OF RANDOMNESS AND
PSEUDO-RANDOMNESS
The source of randomness for ring-oscillator-based RBGs
is the accumulated jitter present in the signals of ROs. The
jitter contains both noise and a deterministic component.
Both components influence the statistical properties of the
output sequence, but only the noise component is a source
of true randomness. The deterministic component is a source
of pseudo-randomness. Therefore, to decide if a source of
random bits is suitable for cryptography, we must assess the
amount of true randomness and pseudo-randomness present
in the output streams. Two basic methods were proposed
for distinguishing pseudo randomness and true randomness
for ring oscillator-based RBGs. In both methods, we repeat
experiments many times starting from identical initial condi-
tions. Because pseudo-randomness is deterministic, it shows
identical behavior in each repetition of the experiment. True
randomness provides different behavior for identical initial
conditions. To ensure identical initial conditions, we replaced
the inverters shown in Figs. 1 and 2 with NAND gates
triggered by an external signal. In the method described in
[26], the authors recorded 1000 restarts of a ring oscillator,
Fibonacci ring oscillator (FIRO) and Galois ring oscillator
(GARO). For a given oscillator, the curves diverge from each
other quickly. The amount of true randomness in the curves
obtained was measured by the computation of the standard
deviation of the output voltage as a function of time. If this
standard deviation was relatively large, then extracting one bit
of true randomness by sampling was easy and reliable [26].
The second method does not assess true randomness contained
in the output of a single ring oscillator, but it checks the quality
of sequences obtained for successive positions of a bit in
time sequences produced by restarts [34], [35]. Therefore, this
method is more suitable for assessing the randomness of RBGs
containing more than one RO. The method checks, with the
chi-square test, the distribution of bits in sequences obtained
for successive positions of a bit in time sequences produced
by restarts. This approach was first proposed in paper [34]
and described in detail in [35]. In the experiments, 20000 bits
were produced for one restart. The number of restarts was
equal to 2048, i.e., it was the same as in [35]. It yields 20000
sequences with N = 2048 elements each. If, among the 20000
sequences, there are one or two successive sequences that fail
the chi-square test, these failures may be produced by a perfect
random source [35]. The value of statistic χ2 is computed as
χ2 =
(N0 −N · P0)
2
N · P0
+
(N1 −N · P1)
2
N · P1
, (9)
where N0 is the number of zeros in an N -bit sequence and N1
is the number of ones in this sequence. N ·P0 is the expected
number of zeros and N · P1 is the expected number of ones.
Because N · P0 = N · P1 = N/2 equation (9) becomes [35]
χ2 =
∆2
N
, (10)
where ∆ is the difference between the number of zeros and
ones. For a significance level of α = 0.01, the critical χ2c value
is equal to 6.635. If the value of statistic (10) is smaller than
6.635, there is no reason to reject the hypothesis that zeros and
ones occur in the m-th, N -element sequence with the same
probability. A sequence composed of N = 2048 bits passes
the chi-square test if and only if ∆ < 116.5696 . . . .Thus,
the difference between the number of zeros and ones cannot
exceed 116. A 2048-bit sequence does not pass the chi-square
test if and only if ∆ ≥ 117. The probability that the number
of zeros differs from the number of ones by at least 117 is
p = 1− p′, and p′ is the probability that the number of zeros
differs from the number of ones by no more than 116. Because
N is even, ∆ can be only even, including ∆ = 0. For a perfect
random source, the probability p′ can be computed from the
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following formula [35]
p′ =
1
22048
[C(1024)2048 +
58∑
i=1
(C(1024−i)2048 + C
(1024+i)
2048 )] =
= 0.990289 . . .
(11)
Because p = 1 − p′ it is also that p = 0.009711 . . . .
If 2048-bit sequences are equally probable, they fail the
chi-square test statistically every 1/p ≈ 103 sequences. Two
successive sequences do not pass the same test every
1/p2 ≈ 10604 sequences and three successive sequences fail
every 1/p3 ≈ 106 sequences. Because 106 is significantly
greater than 20000, among 20000 chi-square test results, there
is at most one such case for a perfectly random source. If
the sequences are produced by a nonrandom source, 2048-bit
sequences fail the chi-square test for three successive values
of m, m = 1, 2, . . . , 20000 many times. A computer program
searches the results of 20000 chi-square tests for the greatest
m for which the 2048-bit sequences fail the chi-square test
for m, m− 1 and m− 2. For j > m and a given significance
level of the test, there is no reason to reject the hypothesis that
zeros and ones occur with the same probability in successive
2048-bit sequences. Because the equal probability of zero
and one in a 2048-bit sequence produced for any j > m
is impossible for a deterministic system, we assume that the
elements of this sequence are produced by a random source.
The smallest j is equal to m + 1 and denoted by mmin. If
we select every j-th bit from the original sequence as the
output, where j < mmin, we obtain a sequence with initial
bits similar to those previously generated by repeating the
generation. To avoid this result, we must select every j-th bit
with j satisfying j ≥ mmin. We emphasize that the repetition
of the generation is typical in cryptography because random
numbers are produced when they are needed. The continuous
generation of random numbers leads to an undesirable waste
of power and simplifies attacks against the RBG. Figures 6–8
present the values of mmin for the combined RBG with τ
implemented as two inverters, one latch and a delay line with
different values [38].
The shapes of the curves in Figs. 6–8 are similar. For all
sampling frequencies, the value for mmin decreases irregularly
with the increase of K . With more source generators, we
increase the randomness of the output sequence. For small K ,
large differences in randomness between combined RBGs with
different realizations of τ can be observed for all sampling
frequencies. If K is large, a combined RBG with inverters
and latches offers similar randomness. The combined RBG
using ROs with the delay τ realized with carry chain logic is
worse for all fL. Simultaneously, the same generator produces
sequences that pass NIST tests for all sampling frequencies
and K significantly smaller than that reported in the literature
[38]. It basically indicates that a deterministic component
of the accumulated jitter is responsible for the very good
statistical properties at the output of this type combined RBG.
It also confirms the results of N. Bochard et al. that the
method of Wold and Tan can provide sequences that pass
all statistical tests when ring oscillators do not exhibit any
jitter [33]. The result above does not eliminate this generator
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Fig. 6. The values of mmin for RBGs from Fig. 2 and three realizations
of the delay τ , fL = 100 MHz.
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Fig. 7. The values of mmin for RBGs from Fig. 2 and three realizations
of the delay τ , fL = 150 MHz.
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Fig. 8. The values of mmin for RBGs from Fig. 2 and three realizations
of the delay τ , fL = 200 MHz.
from cryptographic applications. To obtain a random sequence,
we choose every j-th element of the sequence produced by
the RBG described, where j ≥ mmin. For example, if the
combined RBG uses 50 source generators, it is sufficient
to choose every 10th bit to obtain a random sequence for
fL = 100 MHz. It reduces the bit rate to 10 Mbit/s, but the
ROs do not synchronize each other, and the frequency injection
attack is significantly hampered.
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Fig. 9. Combined RO-based RBG with individual sources of sampling
frequency.
IV. ENHANCING THE RANDOMNESS OF A COMBINED RBG
Although it is expected that RO-based RBG with delay
line is significantly more resistant to injection attacks and to
the environmental changes compared to solutions described in
the literature, its throughput may not be satisfactory in some
applications. To increase the value of this parameter, we have
to decrease mmin. One of the possible methods which can
be applied in FPGAs is the change of the source of sampling
frequency fL from quartz oscillator to ring oscillator which
offers larger jitter. Because such change does not significantly
decrease mmin, we have assumed that the output of each
RO is sampled by another ring oscillator with significantly
smaller frequency, assigned to this RO (Fig. 9). We used pairs
of ROs from Table II. The output of oscillator 1 is sampled
by oscillator 33, the output of oscillator 2 is sampled by
oscillator 34, etc. Generally, the output of the l-th oscillator, is
sampled by the (l+K) RO. The values of of mmin obtained
for modified combined RBG (curve RO D RO) and for the
combined RBG from Fig. 2, using delay τ implemented as
two inverters, one latch and a delay line with different values,
are shown in Figs. 10–12.
Comparing RNGs with carrry4, we see that the use of
additional ROs decreases mmin for almost all K . The greatest
gain is observed for the highest sampling frequency and K
between 8 and 22. This is particularly promising because the
smallest K that ensures at the output sequences that pass all
statistical tests is also relatively small [38]. The results of tests
obtained for combined RBGs with inverters and latches will
not be further considered because of the sensitivity of RBGs
to the injection attack.
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Fig. 10. The values of mmin for RBGs from Fig. 9 and four realizations
of the delay τ , fL = 100 MHz.
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Fig. 11. The values of mmin for RBGs from Fig. 9 and four realizations
of the delay τ , fL = 150 MHz.
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Fig. 12. The values of mmin for RBGs from Fig. 9 and four realizations
of the delay τ , fL = 200 MHz.
V. THE STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF BIT SEQUENCES
PRODUCED BY A COMBINED RBG USING ROS WITH
DIFFERENT DELAYS
To assess the statistical properties of the binary sequences
produced by the combined RBG using the dedicated delay
lines and additional ROs as a source of sampling frequencies,
we used the statistical tests described in “A statistical Test
Suite for Random and Pseudo-Random Number Generators
for Cryptographic Applications”, document 800-22 prepared
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[44]. These tests are often referred to as the NIST 800-22
statistical test suite or, simply, the NIST 800-22 tests. During
testing, we applied two approaches proposed by NIST: (1)
we examined the proportion Rβ of sequences that passed
a statistical test, and (2) we examined the distribution of
P -values computed by the software; that is, we examined
the value of PT [44]. We also assumed the standard set of
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TABLE III
THE RESULTS OF THE NIST 800-22 TESTS FOR COMBINED RBG;
fL = 100 MHZ
Type of test K = 12 K = 15
Rβ PT Rβ PT
Frequency 0.9890 0.04010 0.9970 0.35048
Block Frequency 0.9880 0.12962 0.9920 0.62254
Cumulative Sums* 0.9910 0.50619 0.9940 0.59347
Runs 0.9930 0.50421 0.9920 0.39072
Longest Run of Ones 0.9870 0.71567 0.9910 0.72380
Rank 0.9900 0.04450 0.9860 0.50027
Spectral DFT 0.9910 0.22364 0.9890 0.45405
Non-overlapping Temp.* 0.9830 0.05128 0.9830 0.00624
Overlapping Templates 0.9890 0.62869 0.9870 0.22836
Universal 0.9860 0.79439 0.9880 0.06087
Approximate Entropy 0.9910 0.89917 0.9910 0.82727
Random Excursions* 0.9853 0.10282 0.9852 0.15748
Random Exc. Var.** 0.9853 0.04897 0.9869 0.03260
Serial* 0.9870 0.20773 0.9820 0.21900
Linear Complexity 0.9950 0.09542 0.9930 0.62254
TABLE IV
THE RESULTS OF THE NIST 800-22 TESTS FOR COMBINED RBG;
fL = 150 MHZ
Type of test K = 12 K = 15
Rβ PT Rβ PT
Frequency 0.9900 0.23803 0.9920 0.46923
Block Frequency 0.9900 0.40649 0.9890 0.24050
Cumulative Sums* 0.9910 0.46541 0.9910 0.06563
Runs 0.9950 0.48270 0.9960 0.81472
Longest Run of Ones 0.9830 0.85304 0.9900 0.41902
Rank 0.9900 0.84293 0.9900 0.08610
Spectral DFT 0.9880 0.18656 0.9850 0.11204
Non-overlapping Temp.* 0.9820 0.02641 0.9830 0.02214
Overlapping Templates 0.9910 0.38211 0.9880 0.75384
Universal 0.9880 0.36858 0.9930 0.10561
Approximate Entropy 0.9930 0.08201 0.9930 0.20773
Random Excursions* 0.9869 0.05910 0.9887 0.28352
Random Exc. Var.** 0.9820 0.02477 0.9823 0.04896
Serial* 0.9890 0.48853 0.9870 0.34886
Linear Complexity 0.9900 0.09833 0.9880 0.88166
parameters proposed by NIST in v. 1.8. The significance level
was β = 0.01. The frequency fL was equal to 100 MHz,
150 MHz, and 200 MHz. For greater fL, e.g., equal to 250
MHz, delays between elements of the cascade from Fig. 1
are greater than the period of the sampling frequency, and
the whole structure stops working properly. The results of the
tests performed for the three sampling frequencies mentioned
are shown in Tables III–V. The minimum passing value for
the standard set of parameters was approximately 0.9805. The
minimum PT value was 0.0001. An asterisk * denotes that
this test consists of several subtests and that the worst result
is shown. For tests marked with **, the minimum passing
value for the standard set of parameters was approximately
0.9777.
The sequences fail only random-excursions-variant test for
the PT value, fL = 200 MHz and K = 12. The all
tests are satisfied for fL equal to 100 MHz and 150 MHz
for K ≥ 12, which is significantly better result than that
reported in the literature [31], [32], [34], [35], [38]. Perfect
results of statistical tests suggest that the choice of greater
frequency fL is better because of the greater throughput.
This is only partially true because the throughput is indeed
TABLE V
THE RESULTS OF THE NIST 800-22 TESTS FOR COMBINED RBG;
fL = 200 MHZ
Type of test K = 12 K = 15
Rβ PT Rβ PT
Frequency 0.9890 0.07525 0.9930 0.27846
Block Frequency 0.9890 0.06087 0.9910 0.70341
Cumulative Sums* 0.9850 0.06087 0.9940 0.16170
Runs 0.9890 0.84122 0.9890 0.07905
Longest Run of Ones 0.9900 0.31154 0.9910 0.28402
Rank 0.9910 0.48658 0.9860 0.78110
Spectral DFT 0.9890 0.83256 0.9920 0.94829
Non-overlapping Temp.* 0.9830 0.00731 0.9820 0.00436
Overlapping Templates 0.9890 0.99425 0.9860 0.43359
Universal 0.9900 0.88616 0.9890 0.36028
Approximate Entropy 0.9900 0.75581 0.9900 0.17958
Random Excursions* 0.9838 0.01761 0.9825 0.01862
Random Exc. Var.** 0.9838 0.00000 0.9857 0.16628
Serial* 0.9900 0.24549 0.9930 0.84464
Linear Complexity 0.9890 0.89776 0.9870 0.74789
greater, but the true randomness of the output bits can be
smaller. For example, if the combined RBG uses 15 source
generators, it is sufficient to choose every 22nd bit to obtain
a random sequence for fL = 100 MHz. It reduces the bit
rate to approximately 4.54 Mbit/s. For fL = 200 MHz,
we obtain mmin = 72 and approximately 2.77 Mbit/s. On
the other hand, if we choose K = 20, we have ∼5.88
Mbit/s for fL = 100 MHz (mmin = 17) and ∼7.14 Mbit/s
for fL = 200 MHz (mmin = 28). In the both cases the
throughput obtained for the combined RBG with additional
ROs is significantly greater than the throughput observed for
the same combined RBG but without additional ROs.
The increase of K over 32 is very limited because of the
condition fH > fL. We can decrease the sampling frequency
fL below 100 MHz but it decreases the output bit rate. If the
resources of FPGA are not critical the optimal choice seems
to be generator from Fig. 2 with K greater than 80. In this
case, we still have that fH > fL = 100 MHz but mmin does
not exceed 5. It yields the efficient bit rate at the output of the
combined RBG not smaller than 20 Mbit/s for Virtex-5.
VI. CONCLUSION
Combining XOR bits produced at the same time by many
independent random number generators is an efficient method
for producing random sequences that pass every statistical test.
This method requires relatively large resources, and excellent
statistical properties can be observed for both deterministic and
nondeterministic systems. From a cryptography perspective the
elements of output sequence should be unpredictable which
require the use of a physical source of randomness. Although
the FPGAs are deterministic circuits, we can find phenomena,
like jitter in ring oscillators, which can be used to produce
unpredictable sequences. Such generator was proposed by
Sunar et. al. and next modified by Wold and Tan. The use of
delay lines as τ in the generator of Wold and Tan has not been
considered in the literature. To apply sequences produced by
this generator in cryptography, we have to choose only certain
bits of the original sequence as output. The throughput is
significantly reduced but it is still greater than for the generator
of Wold and Tan. It is also expected that RBGs described
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in this paper are more robust to injection attack than known
solutions of RBGs using ROs. The latter is guaranteed by two
elements: the realization of τ with carry chain logic which is
robust to different cryptographic attacks, e.g., to power attack,
and the distribution of frequencies of ROs over a very wide
range. The use of delay lines with different delays for different
ROs hampers synchronization between ROs implemented in
the same FPGA preventing the quality degradation of RO-
based combined RBGs.
The generators described in this paper can be an inter-
esting alternative for cryptographic systems for which the
resources are not critical. They can be used, e.g., as generators
of initialization vectors for block ciphers, in authentications
schemes, as generators of salts for passwords storage or as
generators of seeds for pseudo-random number generators.
When a cryptographic system is implemented as ASIC, better
performance of the RBG is expected. A designer can control
some parameters, e.g., the length of internal connections,
which is very difficult for FPGAs. Consequently, he/she can
ensure better reproducibility of the RBG parameters, smaller
correlation between ring oscillators and better robustness to
cryptographic attacks.
The goal of future research can be methods of decreasing
mmin for a given resources. One of the promising technique
seems to be compression of bits produced in a time window
sliding along the generated bits. This method requires fast
and parallel processing. Another method which can potentially
decrease mmin is the use of another phenomena observed in
digital circuits, e.g., the metastable states.
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